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Abstract 
The paper examines the legal developments associated with new Hungarian Constitution, a 
text that, by entrenching the normative convictions and institutional solutions favoured by a 
contingent political majority, gives rise to a distinct institutional setting: the ‘partisan 
constitution’. The analysis unfolds in three stages. Firstly, the new Hungarian Constitution is 
contrasted with the idea of pluralist constitution traditionally inspiring national European 
constitutions. Secondly, by investigating the reactions of European institutions to the 
approval and implementation of the partisan constitution, the difficulties in affirming EU 
values post enlargement are discussed. Finally, the Hungarian Constitution is assessed also in 
the light of the prevailing contemporary EU legal culture. It is argued that the Hungarian 
Constitution reproduces in amplified and grotesque form a more profound and pervasive 
phenomenon: the corrosion of European constitutional culture. Thus, rather than looking at it 
as a backward product and a contingent malaise, we should study and criticise it as the most 
emblematical example of a broader trend: the decline of the idea of pluralist constitution. 
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The ‘Partisan Constitution’ and the corrosion 
of European constitutional culture 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last two years, public opinion received extensive information1 on the 
adoption and implementation of the new Hungarian Constitution 
(“Fundamental Law”, in the official denomination).2 To the irritation of its 
authors, reports did not celebrate the event as the crowning of the transition 
in Central Eastern Europe – until then, Hungary had been the only country 
not to have approved an entirely new constitution after the fall of 
Communism. Most of the comments expressed concern for the dramatic 
political turn of a country that, back in 1989, had been at the forefront in the 
struggle for constitutional democracy. Despite many reassurances to the 
contrary by Hungarian constitution makers, the Fundamental Law was 
portrayed as a divisive document ushering in a potentially illiberal political 
and legal order.  
                                                        
1 See I. Deák, ‘Hungary: The Threat’, New York Review of Books, April 28, 2011; ‘The Threat in 
Hungary: An Exchange’, exchange between G. Schöpflin and I. Deák, New York Review of Books, 
June 23, 2011 and A. Ludány, ‘A threat to whom?’, http://www.mbk.org/Article760.html (last 
visited October 2013). See also P. Krugman, ‘Depression and Democracy’, The New York Times, 
December 11, 2011; J-W. Müller, ‘The Hungary question could strengthen the EU’, The Guardian, 
2 April 2012; J-W. Müller, ‘Europe’s democracy dilemma – how and when to step in?’, The 
Guardian, 19 July 2012; H. Kunzru, ‘The Frightening Hungarian Crackdown’ The New Yorker, 8 
January 2013. 
2 For an English version of the text see 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/2/ab/30000/Alap_angol.pdf  (last visited October 2013). 
The Fundamental Law was promulgated on 25 April 2011 and entered into force on 1 January 
2012. 
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According to the critics, the original sin of the Fundamental Law rests with 
the process leading to its adoption.3 In the 2010 elections, the current 
conservative ruling coalition gained a broad parliamentary majority sufficient 
to seize constitutional politics. Following the amendment procedure of the 
previous constitution, it approved a new constitutional text regardless of the 
boycott of the opposition and protests in the streets. The genesis of the 
document influenced its contents: the text is ideologically overloaded, and 
also the institutional architecture betrays a dubious commitment to 
parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. Hence, the claim that the 
Fundamental Law is a ‘partisan constitution’, i.e. a text that, by entrenching 
the normative convictions and institutional solutions favoured by a 
contingent political majority, departs from mainstream European 
constitutional culture and its idea of a ‘pluralist constitution’. 
There are at least three reasons justifying an interest for the vicissitudes of the 
Hungarian constitution. The first is the most obvious: by looking at a 
‘negative’ case-study, one can reassert the fundamentals of European 
constitutional culture and offer a constructive contribution to the ongoing 
Hungarian political and constitutional debate. The second reason involves the 
reactions of European institutions to the document and the problem of 
conditionality post enlargement. The adoption and implementation of the 
Fundamental Law attracted the attention of both the Council of Europe and 
the European Union and, by looking at their responses, one can evaluate 
Europe’s capacity to affirm its fundamental values vis-à-vis national 
constitution making. This leads to a third motive of interest. The failings of 
Europe in defending the pluralist constitution reveal a broader scenario in 
which Hungary is not alone in corroding European constitutional culture. 
                                                        
3 K. L. Scheppele, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution’, The New York Times, December 19, 2011, 
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional-
revolution/ (last visited October 2013). 
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This is not just because the Council of Europe and the European Union have 
been so far unable to persuade the Hungarian government to reconsider its 
ill-conceived constitutional adventure. More critically, recent developments in 
EU law show that the Union is deeply implicated in a legal and political 
culture structurally similar to that it is expected to counter.  
The paper touches upon all three aspects. Firstly, it illustrates the idea of 
pluralist constitution and its role in both enhancing and containing political 
conflicts. Then, it goes to the implications of the idea. As a rule, pluralist 
constitutions result from consensual constitutional politics reaching across 
party lines; they offer a common symbolic space allowing for citizens’ 
collective identification and establish open structures for the recognition and 
mediation of their conflicts. While this notion was central to the constitutional 
setting established in post-1989 Hungary, it no longer holds true in the 
Fundamental Law. This is not only due to the biased genesis of the document. 
Also constitutional symbolism discourages collective identification, 
notwithstanding the obsessive references to nationalism and intergenerational 
solidarity employed to disguise the weak legitimacy of the text. This 
instrumental attitude towards the nation and solidarity comes at a high price: 
by investing in an ethno-cultural conception of the polity and a rhetoric 
mixing heroism, victimhood and conservative values, the Fundamental Law 
opens the door to unreflective and illiberal nation building. This aspect is 
somewhat downplayed in the norms concerning constitutional organisation, 
but also in this part of the text there are several elements departing from the 
idea of pluralist constitution.   
Moving to the European reactions to the Fundamental Law, the paper 
examines three different institutional trajectories. The first is ‘soft 
constitutionalism’, the reaction of the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe. In its opinions on the Fundamental Law, the Venice Commission 
The ‘Partisan Constitution’ 
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develops accurate examinations of its criticalities in the light of European 
constitutional culture. However, the impact of these documents seems 
limited, being mainly entrusted to peer pressure within the Council of 
Europe. A second trajectory is political in nature and takes place at the 
European Parliament. Here, the paper traces the main coordinates of the 
parliamentary debate on the new Hungarian constitution describing the 
unproductive dialectic between left-leaning criticism and the defence of 
national sovereignty by conservative MEPs. ‘Low-profile legalism’, the 
reaction developed by means of infringement proceedings by the Commission 
and Court of Justice, is only apparently more promising. Whereas the 
instrument employed may induce significant legal changes, it also entails a 
drastic depoliticization of the constitutional debate for infringement 
proceedings fragment the whole discussion on the Fundamental Law in a 
series of less salient and opaque administrative dossiers. 
The inability of the Union to provide a meaningful defence of constitutional 
democracy brings in the third aspect of the problem: the corrosion of 
European constitutional culture. The paper argues that discredit of the idea of 
the pluralist constitution does not come only from opportunistic Hungarian 
rulers adventuring into constitutional politics. The corrosion of European 
constitutional culture has deeper roots connected with the rise of post-politics, 
a new common sense in which the role of the constitution and the place of 
partisanship are confounded. This is the point at which Hungary and the 
Union meet and this is also the point at which their different legal orders 
reveal unimagined assonances. Against a similar background, the 
Fundamental Law appears less of a backward document conceived by 
nostalgic political forces; rather, it emerges as a product of modernity 
exposing in a grotesque form the traits of an incipient legal culture led astray 
from the path of constitutional democracy. 
Marco Dani 
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2. European constitutional culture: the idea of ‘pluralist 
constitution’ 
2.1. The place of partisanship, the role of pluralist constitutions 
European constitutional democracies are premised on a key distinction 
between constituent and constituted power.4 The point was famously 
captured by Paine’s definition of modern constitutions: a constitution, he 
noted, “is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government is only the 
creature of a constitution”.5 Indeed, the constitution “is not the act of its 
government, but of the people constituting a government”.6 In Paine’s view, a 
clear correlation existed between the people, the constitution and 
government: the people (constituent power) create a constitution through 
which government (constituted power) is established. Government, therefore, 
neither makes nor can alter the constitutional laws which bind it; these can be 
modified only through an exercise of the constituent power by the people.7  
Although the distinction between constituent and constituted power was 
anathema to more traditionalist political and legal thinkers,8 the modern idea 
of constitution did not break entirely with earlier juridical experience. Its 
inherent dualism was rooted in previous legal tradition, where the dichotomy 
between justice and power or ius ex parte societatis and ius ex parte principis 
figured prominently.9 But despite this venerable pedigree, in the 19th century 
modern constitutionalism gained foothold and stabilised only in the United 
                                                        
4 D. Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in P. 
Dobner, M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010), 9. 
5 T. Paine, ‘Rights of Man’ in his Rights of Man, Common Sense and other Political Writings [1791-
1792] (Oxford University Press, 1995), 122.  
6 Ibidem. 
7 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 279. 
8 Ibidem, nt. 14. 
9 G. Zagrebelsky, La legge e la sua giustizia (il Mulino, 2008), 15-21. 
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States10. In Europe, frequent political turbulences collapsed the distinction 
between constituent and constituted power, leaving (in the best of times) the 
operation of government constrained only by a “strong barrier of moral 
conviction”.11  
The modern idea of constitution revamped in continental Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II. Many factors contributed to its resurrection, but a 
renewed attitude to social conflicts figures on the top of the list.12 European 
constitution makers had learnt that social conflicts could neither be 
suppressed nor wished away from existence. Thus, neither authoritarian rule 
nor liberal constitutions could deliver a stable political and legal order. The 
latter could be attained only by recognising both the value and the disruptive 
potential of the social question. As witnessed by previous political experience, 
excessive emphasis on the unity of the polity yields exclusion and alienation, 
while unbounded conflicts lead to disintegration.  
It soon became clear that a more appropriate balance between conflict and 
cooperation could be achieved by means of pluralist constitutions13. Key to 
this new legal and political setting was the idea of institutionalising social 
conflicts.14 Constitutions were not meant to recompose social divisions in an 
artificial unity, but to establish the formal and substantive prerequisites for 
political competition.15 Accordingly, their task was firstly securing adequate 
room for political conflicts, then ensuring that their acting out did not 
                                                        
10 The distinctive spirit of the US Constitution has been best encapsulated in the concept of 
‘dualist democracy’ proposed by B. Ackermann, We the People. Foundations (Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 6-7. 
11 J. S. Mill, On Liberty [1859] (Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), Ch. 1, at 13. 
12 R. Bin, ‘Che cos’è la Costituzione?’ (2007) XXVII Quaderni Costituzionali, 19-22. 
13 The most notable examples are the 1946 French Constitution, the 1947 Italian Constitution and 
the 1949 Grundgesetz. 
14 R. Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict: An Essay on the Politics of Liberty (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1988), 107. 
15 M. Loughlin, Sword&Scales. An Examination of the Relationship Between Law&Politics (Hart 
Publishing, 2000), 189-195. 
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jeopardise political pluralism. As Mouffe has observed, “conflict, in order to 
be accepted as legitimate needs to take a form that does not destroy the 
political association. This means that some kind of common bond must exist 
between the parties in conflict, so that they will not treat their opponents as 
enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands illegitimate […]”.16 This 
notion resonates deeply in the structure of pluralist constitutions. Here, 
partisanship and cooperation are conceptually separated giving rise to 
distinct domains in which constituted and constituent power acquire a 
renewed historical meaning. 
In pluralist constitutions, constituted power came to be viewed as the 
province of partisanship and political contestation. In this respect, 
constitutional norms operated in the direction of broadening political 
participation and expanding the role of government. Firstly, they extended 
the franchise by abolishing the remaining class, gender and race restrictions. 
Secondly, they rendered status quo allocations and social positions negotiable17 
and contingent.18 Within pluralist constitutions, the degree of protection of 
both property rights and social entitlements became in large part a function of 
the political process and majoritarian decision-making. Ultimately, social 
justice replaced property as the prevailing concern of the newly established 
strategy of integration.19 This idea was sufficiently defined to exclude both 
socialist rule and unrestrained laissez-faire.20 At the same time, its more 
specific meaning remained constantly exposed to the outcomes of political 
                                                        
16 C. Mouffe, On the Political (Routledge, 2005), 20.  
17 Dahrendorf, above n. 14, 21. 
18 A. O. Hirschmann, ‘Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society’ (1994) 22 Political 
Theory, 214. 
19 A more recent codification of this principle can be found in article 2 of the Polish Constitution. 
20 D. Miller, Principles of Social Justice (Harvard University Press, 2003), 3-4. 
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and social disputes for the direction of government and the contents of 
legislation.21 
In charge of the domain of societal cooperation, constituent power stood 
isolated from political conflict. The task of defining the terms of political 
association required political parties qua constitution makers to set aside their 
routine distributive struggles and engage in constitutional politics. This 
entailed a cooperative effort in which each party was requested to cross the 
boundaries of its particular worldview on behalf of peaceful coexistence.22 The 
overall result was a peculiar form of consensual politics that, inaugurated at 
the outset of a new constitution, could subsequently re-emerge in the less 
spectacular forms of constitutional justice and constitutional amendment. 
Admittedly, even constitutional politics involved a certain degree of 
contestation as most of the times constitution makers could not attain more 
than a ‘conflictual consensus’.23 However, this was the only available form of 
political unity. Constitutions could no longer prescribe, entrench and impose 
the values and institutional solutions favoured by a particular segment of the 
society.24 To make a claim of legitimate authority, constitutions had to offer a 
shared symbolic space allowing the identification of virtually all the segments 
of society.25 Thus, as a genuine creature of the people, the constitution could 
not but reflect its elusive consensus and irreducible plurality.26  
                                                        
21 The under-determinacy of social justice has brought about the essentially procedural approach 
to the concept of Sozialstaat. On the relevant constitutional debate, see C. Joerges, 
‘Sozialstaatlichkeit in Europe? A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to the Law of the EU and the 
Proceduralisation of Constitutionalisation’ (2009) German Law Journal, 336-338. 
22 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 153. 
23 Mouffe, above n. 16, 121, defines it as “consensus on the ethico-political values of liberty and 
equality for all, dissent about their interpretation”. 
24 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 133-134. 
25 Mouffe, above n. 16, 121. 
26 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 140. 
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Of course, the pluralist nature of post-war constitution did not make them 
neutral documents. The idea of pluralism entails a strong normative 
commitment to active liberty and, as such, it stands in stark opposition to 
illiberal worldviews.27 Yet, the political character of the constitution and 
constitutional politics should not be confounded with partisan politics. 
Obscuring this distinction can be a fatal mistake for the legitimacy of the 
constitution rests in the support of virtually all the components of the 
society.28 If, by contrast, constitutional politics is carried out in the partisan 
register, certain political choices may end up being pre-empted and particular 
segments of the society excluded or underrepresented. Relegated to an unruly 
terrain outside the institutional perimeter, conflicts reacquire their disruptive 
potential undermining legal and political stability. 
 
2.2. Constitution making, ideology and institutional setting 
Sketched in its fundamental traits, the idea of pluralist constitution can now 
be explored in some of its implications. The first involves its genesis, an 
aspect for which some degree of precaution is in order. Although no 
necessary correlation exists between patterns of constitution making and 
constitutional models, the contents of constitutions are not impervious to their 
origins.29 The making of a constitution plays a crucial role in the 
determination of its identity.30 This applies in particular to European pluralist 
constitutions: whereas the variety of processes leading to their adoption can 
hardly be subsumed within a single model of constitution making, important 
                                                        
27 This is particularly evident in contexts of militant democracy, on which see J-W. Müller, 
Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton University Press, 2007), 22-23. 
28 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 138. 
29 M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject. Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and 
Community (Routledge, 2010), 185. 
30 Ibidem, 185-186. 
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congruencies can be identified at a more abstract level. European pluralist 
constitutions share the attribute of social norms resulting from or, at least, 
reflecting the autonomy of the main political forces in a polity.31 Indeed, the 
making of a pluralist constitution involves the negotiation of an agreement 
whose clauses not only encapsulates the compromise between the current 
most influent political actors, but reflects also the claims of the historically 
most significant political cultures in a polity.  
The challenge of defining the terms of political association has profound 
implications on the attitude of political actors embarking in constitutional 
politics. Given that in contemporary societies no single party can claim to 
fully embody the will of the people,32 each of them is invited to make 
concessions and abandon the idea of incorporating in the constitution its 
preferred project of society and government.33 The circumstances of 
constitutional politics inspire a form of constitutional loyalism34 in which 
parties demise their more factional interests and accept to have their political 
identity transformed by the experience of constitution making.35 Specific 
institutional solutions are arranged to achieve this outcome. Constituent 
forces are traditionally gathered in sites ideally insulated from routine 
parliamentary activity such as constitutional assemblies or conventions.36 
More recently, experiments in constitution making have also been attempted 
                                                        
31 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 150-151. As noted by S. Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, 
and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 11 Constellations, 153, “… successful constitution-making 
is not only about entrenching the right first principles, it is also about including citizens in the 
process of constitution-making in the right way. I call this move to inclusion, the democratization 
of popular sovereignty”. 
32 A. Arato, ‘Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models, principles and 
elements of democratic constitution-making’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism, 174. 
33 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 143. 
34 Ibidem, 325. 
35 Ibidem, 143. 
36 Ibidem, 133. 
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through roundtable talks.37 Conceived in the context of pacted transitions 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes, this solution offers a way out in 
situations of stalemate between incumbent regimes and their democratic 
opponents.38 By favouring an initial compromise between opponents, 
roundtable talks ensure a break without violence from the previous regime 
opening the door to elections and, finally, democratic constitution making.39 
A second implication of the idea of pluralist constitution concerns its 
ideological dimension. We are faced here with the most vocal parts of 
constitutions, those in which their educational task and contribution to nation 
building are more explicit.40 In this regard, pluralist constitutions are not 
exception to a more general rule: coherently with their origins, they set out a 
rich ideological apparatus aiming at a collective identification of the people in 
all its component parts.41 Symbolism and iconography, however, are not only 
reflective but also constitutive of social and political reality.42 The educational 
propensity of the constitution manifests itself in a certain predisposition to 
shape the people at a both collective and individual level.43 Whereas 
individuals are target of normative claims and regulatory strategies consistent 
with the idea of free and equal citizenship, polities are encouraged to 
rationalise their collective identities reinterpreting national culture, values 
and history in the light of universalist constitutional principles.44 
                                                        
37 The most complete instantiation is the South African constitutional process, see Arato, above n. 
32, 179-184. For the Hungarian experience, see below 2.3. 
38 Ibidem, 180. 
39 In this respect, the process leading up to the adoption of the Spanish constitution is exemplary. 
See Rosenfeld, above n. 29, 136-146. 
40 Loughlin, above n. 7, 306-307. 
41 See, for example, article 2 of the French Constitution. 
42 On the descriptive as well as rationalizing character of pluralist constitutions see Chambers, 
above n. 31, 158-161. 
43 The processes of subjectification of individuals are explored in N. Rose, Inventing Our Selves. 
Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119-122 and 152. 
44 Müller, above n. 27, 27-30. 
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It is in this context that constitutions enter in a complex relation with the past. 
Earlier constitutional experiences are reprocessed to be reclaimed or 
repudiated in the text.45 In most of the cases, constitutions propose a mix of 
condescending and critical postures, highly dependent on the political 
judgment on pre-constitutional identity. Choices expressed in this regard 
have an obvious impact on the educational profile of the constitution: the 
more pre-constitutional materials are reincorporated, the more the 
constitution will amplify the characters of the nation; the more pre-
constitutional materials are repudiated, the more national threatening 
tendencies will be countered.46 This latest approach has been best articulated 
by constitutional patriotism, the political theory requiring political attachment 
to centre on the norms, values and procedures of liberal democratic 
constitutions.47 Conceived in post-World War II Germany as a substitute for 
liberal nationalism,48 constitutional patriotism has more recently appealed 
also other jurisdictions coping with the dilemmas of nation building in post-
traditional societies.49 Under constitutional patriotism, identity formation is 
no longer viewed as the glorifying celebration of the past or the trite 
repetition of sacralised rituals. Individual and collective belonging is sought 
through processes of renegotiation of the past in the public sphere,50 giving 
rise to a more complex sense of attachment.51 As Müller noted,52 constitutional 
patriotism resists the temptation to tell “comforting (or disquieting) stories 
about the past”; rather, by reflecting critically on history, it seeks to provide 
                                                        
45 Rosenfeld, above n. 29,187. 
46 C. Sunstein, ‘On property and constitutionalism’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review, 922. 
47 Müller, above n. 27, 1. 
48 Ibidem, Ch. 1. 
49 Ibidem, 2-5. 
50 Ibidem, 32-34. 
51 Ibidem, 29-30. 
52 Ibidem, 8. 
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“the concepts, the languages, to allow citizens to rethink what they might or 
might not have in common, and what they perhaps should have in common”.  
The third implication of the idea of pluralist constitution goes directly to the 
institutional setting. In accordance with their vocation to institutionalise 
conflicts, pluralist constitutions put in place an open architecture devised to 
enhance and contain political contestation.53 Indeed, contemporary complex 
societies seldom embark in authoritative decisions of conflicts through 
exclusionary rules.54 More frequently, constitutions employ different tools. 
Once the most intractable conflicts are resolved or at least silenced, 
irreducible diversities may still persist. In their respect, pluralist constitutions 
show a much more benign attitude revealed by their attempt to embed them 
in their structures.55 This aspect can be noted at both a substantive and 
procedural level. At a substantive level, conflicts are often legitimated 
through the definition of principles.56 This may be done by either elevating 
opposing normative claims to the status of fundamental rights or codifying as 
fundamental norms open-textured notions of justice. At a procedural level, 
instead, political conflicts are key to institutions and procedures designed to 
voice and mediate rival claims.57 It is through similar devices and, notably, the 
recourse to the majority principle58 and representative institutions59 that 
antagonism can be civilised, transforming potentially destructive conflicts 
into more manageable and, possibly, productive forms of political 
competition. 
                                                        
53 G. Azzariti, Diritto e conflitti. Lezioni di diritto costituzionale (Laterza, 2010). 
54 Ibidem, 182-183, observing that conflicts suppressed by authoritative decisions often re-
emerge in aggravated forms. 
55 Ibidem, 276. 
56 On the integrating capacity of principles, see R. Smend, Costituzione e diritto costituzionale 
(translated by J. Luther), [1928] (Giuffrè, 1988), 103. 
57 Azzariti, above n. 53, 216. 
58 Smend, above n. 56, 91. 
59 V. Onida, Le Costituzioni. I principi fondamentali della Costituzione italiana, in G. Amato, A. 
Barbera (eds), Manuale di diritto pubblico, I (il Mulino, 1997), 107. 
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2.3. An application: the 1989 constitution of Hungary 
To a large extent, the constitutional setting introduced in Hungary post 1989 
fulfilled the requirements of a pluralist constitution. Indeed, only in the 
official denomination the new document prolonged its 1949 communist 
antecedent.60 This element of formal continuity symbolised what came to be 
known as the Hungarian “constitutional revolution”.61 Rather than being a 
product of revolutionary outbreak, the transition from the former socialist 
regime took place gradually,62 and respect for the amendment procedure of 
the 1949 constitution was the main guarantee for such a peaceful change.63 
Accordingly, it fell to the socialist Parliament to approve the first 
constitutional amendments leading up to constitutional democracy. But only 
formally was that document originated in the Parliament; the text had been 
negotiated by the incumbent socialist regime and opposition parties in 
‘Roundtable talks’, the informal site governing the transition that had de facto 
obtained a constitution making mandate.64  
The constitution resulting from this process enjoyed a dubious legitimacy. On 
the one hand, the main political forces took part to negotiations and approved 
a text that functionally was in line with the European standards of 
constitutional democracy.  On the other, serious flaws could be detected in the 
procedure for its adoption: not only had the new text been approved by a 
largely discredited Parliament, but also the parties sitting at the Round Table 
did not possess a clear political mandate by the electorate. No meaningful 
                                                        
60 The official denomination of the 1989 constitution was “Act No. XX of 1949 (as amended)”. For 
an English version of the text, see http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1989-
90%20constitution_english.pdf (last visited October 2013). 
61 P. Paczolay, ‘Constitutional Transition and Legal Continuity’ (1992-1993) 8 Connecticut Journal 
of International Law, 560-561. 
62 I. Szikinger, ‘Hungary’s Pliable Constitution’, in J. Zielonka (ed), Democratic Consolidation in 
Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001), Volume 1, 406. 
63 The most important amendment was Act No. XXI of 1989. 
64 Szikinger, above n. 62, 409-414  
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public deliberation took place in the workings of the Round Table and, once 
the text had been agreed, no referendum was organised to make up for those 
shortcomings.65 As a result, the newly enacted constitution was surrounded 
by an elitist flavour as in no sense it could be argued that its text was a 
genuine achievement of the people.  
Undoubtedly, Hungarian constitution makers were conscious of the weak 
popular support of the 1989 constitution. They proclaimed it in a bashful and 
non-ceremonial way66 and they wrote in the preamble that the text approved 
was not the final one.67 In the intentions, the document adopted was a quick 
fix of the 1949 Constitution,68 laying the floor for a second stage of 
constitution making entrusted to the newly elected parliament or, ideally, a 
constituent assembly.69 The fact that a new constitution never materialised 
and that the 1989 constitution remained in effect for more than twenty years 
has a lot to do with the hostile political climate characterising the Hungarian 
transition, but also with the substantial satisfaction with the existing text of 
the political elite.70  
In the years following the approval of the 1989 constitution, however, 
constitutional stability was repeatedly challenged by several amendments 
adopted by the parliament.71 Because of a highly disproportionate electoral 
system, the formal requirement for constitutional amendment – a two-thirds 
                                                        
65 Ibidem, 412-414.  
66 Paczolay, above n. 61, 567-568. 
67 The preamble reads as follows: “In order to facilitate peaceful political transition into a 
constitutional state ready establish a multiparty system, parliamentary democracy and a social 
market economy, the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary hereby establishes the following text 
as the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, until the country’s new constitution is adopted” 
(Italic added). 
68 Szikinger, above n. 62, 413. 
69 A. Arato, ‘Post Sovereign Constitution-making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure, and 
Now What?’ (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights, 24-28. 
70 Szikinger, above n. 62, 427-430. 
71 T. Drinóczi, ‘Revisione e manutenzione costituzionale nell’ordinamento ungherese’, in F. 
Palermo (ed), La “manutenzione” costituzionale (Cedam, 2007), 437. 
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majority in Parliament – did not prevent political parties from pursuing their 
partisan agenda through constitutional politics.72 Occasional amendments, 
however, did not make the idea of a comprehensive constitutional reform go 
away. The most serious attempt was endeavoured in the 1994-1998 
legislature, when the governing coalition between Socialists and liberal Free 
Democrats obtained a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Rather than taking 
advantage of this situation, the coalition resumed the spirit of the Roundtable 
talks and lifted to four-fifths the parliamentary majority required to enact a 
new constitution.73 Moreover, a Constitutional Commission consisting of an 
equal number of representatives from each party represented in Parliament 
was entrusted with the task of preparing a draft text.74 In this preliminary 
stage, the approval of a new text required the support of five parties out of the 
six represented, and two-thirds of the delegates of the Commission.75 After a 
promising start, this attempt aborted in 1996 and so did further proposals put 
forward in 2003 and 2005-2008.76 Those efforts, however, were not entirely 
worthless: in particular, the so-called ‘4/5 rule’ consolidated a sense that 
constitution making ought to originate from consensual politics. 
But how did Hungarian constitution makers translate the idea of pluralist 
constitution in 1989? A first striking feature of the Hungarian constitution was 
its essential wording. No magniloquent formula appeared in the preamble 
and also fundamental rights provisions were framed with terse language. 
This sober tone was coherent with the choice for legal continuity operated by 
Hungarian constitution makers. Due to the role played by the Socialist Party 
in Roundtable talks, a more outspoken preamble was probably 
                                                        
72 Szikinger, above n. 62, 415, referring to the 1989 constitution as “pliable constitution”. 
73 See Act XLIV of 1995, introducing article 24(5). 
74 Drinóczi, above n. 71, 460-463. 
75 Szikinger, above n. 62, 427-428. 
76 Drinóczi, above n. 71, 473-475. 
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unconceivable. For the same reason, no explicit position was taken in respect 
of Hungary’s communist past. Likewise, the interim character of the 
constitution discouraged any other rhetorical foray for the purpose of nation 
building. For instance, no reference was made to the Hungarian religious and 
historical heritage. Paucity in symbolism, however, did not make that 
document un-inspirational. Several provisions were unequivocal in 
distancing the constitution from the previous political and legal regime,77 and 
the transformation in political and social life brought about by the 
Constitutional Court is the most eloquent testimony to the potential of that 
text.78 The modesty of constitutional language, therefore, was no obstacle to 
the fulfilment of the educational task of the constitution: in that document 
citizens could find sufficient textual resources to articulate the normative 
claims and the conflicts of a modern market oriented constitutional 
democracy. 
Legal continuity and a clear commitment to constitutional democracy were 
confirmed in the norms on the institutional setting. No express provision was 
made against the ‘enemies’ of democracy and the rule of law, and an open 
architecture for the legitimation and mediation of conflicts was delineated in 
its essential traits. The constitution laid down the usual substantive 
coordinates of social conflicts,79 but democratic life was articulated also along 
multi-cultural lines.80 On the institutional side, the form of government was 
structured according to the classic parliamentary model,81 with the President 
                                                        
77 The most telling examples are articles 2 (democratic constitutional state), 3 (free political 
association and distinction between the state and political parties), 6 (repudiation of war), 8 
(human rights protection), 9-10 (market economy and private property). 
78 Paczolay, above n. 61, 565. 
79 See the provisions on market economy (article 9), social rights (artt. 16-17 and 66, 70/B, 70/D, 
70/E) and the role of trade unions (articles 4 and 70/C). 
80 See article 68, declaring national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary “constituent part of 
the State”. 
81 See articles 19 and 33, 33/A and 39/A. 
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of the Republic defined as an eminent nonpartisan figure.82 A strong emphasis 
was given to consensual democracy: given the uncertainties for the results of 
the first democratic elections,83 the constitution made significant recourse to 
the two-thirds majority requirement for the adoption of legislation regarding 
the functioning of the state and, more controversially, the discipline of most 
fundamental rights.84 Finally, the constitution assigned an influential role to 
the Constitutional Court, a body perceived in the public opinion as a “quasi-
upper house of parliament”.85 To many commentators, the Court’s 
jurisprudence on human rights acquired a special significance, somehow 
compensating for the precarious legitimacy of the 1989 constitution.86 As a 
matter of fact, constitutional justice prolonged the life of this document, even 
though the Constitutional Court could not appeal far beyond the circle of its 
aficionados and supply the sense of achievement associated with democratic 
constitution making. Thus, the elitist flavour surrounding the 1989 
constitution came to encompass also constitutional adjudication, leaving the 
idea of completing the constitutional transition to populist and anti-
establishment forces. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
82 See article 29. 
83 Drinóczi, above n. 71, 443. 
84 See, e.g., articles 58 to 65. 
85 Szikinger, above n. 62, 425. 
86 Arato, above n. 69, 31. 
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3. Questioning the ‘Partisan Constitution’ 
3.1. The usurpation of constitutional politics 
Hungarians went to the ballots in 2010 in a situation of deep political and 
social strife. In 2009, the financial crisis had taken a dramatic turn bringing 
Hungary close to financial disaster. The incumbent socialist and liberal 
government appeared unable to cope with the economic situation. Besides, it 
was perceived as politically and morally discredited given that its rule had 
been opaque and plagued by clientelism. A ‘government of experts’ was 
appointed to replace it and to enforce a plan of austerity measures that further 
aggravated political resentment. In this context, elections delivered a clear 
and predictable result: the conservative coalition between Fidesz and the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party gained 52.7% of the votes87 which, thanks 
to a disproportionate electoral system,88 were translated in a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority. This was sufficient to activate article 24 (3), the 
procedure to amend the 1989 constitution. It is disputed whether the 
conservative coalition had received an explicit constituent mandate;89 be that 
as it may, it decided to seize the opportunity and adventure into 
constitutional politics. 
Firstly, the conservative coalition approved a number of controversial 
constitutional changes on disparate issues such as taxation, media, the 
reduction of the number of MPs, the reform of the judicial system and 
                                                        
87 Turnout had been relatively low: 64% at the first round; 46% at the second one. The results of 
other parties were the following: Socialist Party, 19.3%; Jobbik, 16.7%; “Politics can be different”, 
6.7% (See http://www.electionresources.org/hu/assembly.php?election=2010 – last visited 
October 2013). 
88 Arato, above n. 69, 32. 
89 For two opposing views, see L. Trócsányi, ‘The Creation of the Basic Law of Hungary’, in L. 
Csink, C. Schanda, A. Zs. Varga (eds), The Basic Law of Hungary. A First Commentary (Clarus Press, 
2012), 7, and K. Kovács, G. A. Tóth, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation’ (2011) 7 European 
Constitutional Law Review, 196. 
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modifications on the composition and jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court.90 Critically, it repealed article 24 (5), the ‘4/5 rule’. Then, the Parliament 
decided to set up an ad hoc committee for constitutional reform. Initially, the 
committee represented all political parties, but it was soon boycotted by the 
left opposition after that proposals to curb the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court had been aired. The workings of this committee 
culminated in a document of regulatory principles adopted by the Parliament 
in March 2011. Yet, this was just a working document for the task of drafting a 
new constitution was conferred to a three members committee appointed by 
the ruling coalition. At this stage, a popular consultation was organised 
sending to all citizens a questionnaire on selected topics to be included in the 
constitution. Only at this point was the draft constitution presented to the 
Parliament, which approved it after only a nine days discussion.91 
Few doubts can be cast on the legality of this process: once the ‘4/5 rule’ was 
repealed, article 24 (3) was the only available legal route to amend the 1989 
constitution.92 However, it is the legitimacy of this process that can seriously 
be questioned.93 By requiring a two-thirds majority, article 24 (3) signalled 
that constitutional politics ought to be conducted with a view to reaching an 
agreement in which the whole or large part of the political spectrum could 
identify. This notion was not only inherent in the rationale of the norm but, as 
seen, it was also coherent with earlier Hungarian constitutional practice.94 
Fidesz and its coalition partner decided to break with this tradition, and 
hiding behind legality was the expedient to mask their usurpation of 
constitutional politics. Indeed, this is the point at which the Fundamental Law 
                                                        
90 For a survey on these constitutional amendments, see Kovács, Tóth, above n. 89, 187-195. 
91 Kovács, Tóth, above n. 89, 196-198. 
92 Yet, what can be disputed is whether repealing the ‘4/5 rule’ with a 2/3 majority was a legal 
move, see A. Arato, above n. 69, 40-43. 
93 This is acknowledged also by authors otherwise supportive of the Fundamental Law, see F. 
Horkay Hörcher, ‘The National Avowal’, in L. Csink, C. Schanda, A. Zs. Varga, above n. 89, 29-30. 
94 See above section 2.3. 
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departs radically from European constitutional culture and that is why 
talking of a ‘partisan constitution’ seems appropriate. 
The distance between the pluralist and the partisan constitution emerges as 
soon as one turns to comparative constitutional history. In the Spanish 
transition to democracy, for instance, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez decided 
to legalise the Communist Party to enable all political parties to participate to 
parliamentary elections antecedent to constitution making.95 In South Africa, 
all political parties were included in constitution making and remarkable 
concessions had to be granted to keep everyone on board.96 Ironically, the 
closest example of a partisan exercise of constitutional politics can be found in 
Communist dictatorships, where the basic law was viewed as a tool through 
which the dominant political party could achieve its policy goals.97 
The precarious legitimacy of the Fundamental Law emerges also by 
considering the tension existing between its contents and the procedure 
employed to approve it. Unlike its more modest predecessor, the 
Fundamental Law is a pretentious text full of revolutionary ambition.98 In the 
preamble (‘National Avowal’), we may read that “after the decades of the 
twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay” Hungarians have “an 
abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal”. Accordingly, the 1949 
constitution is invalidated and other passages of the text express eloquently 
                                                        
95 Rosenfeld, above n. 29, 140. 
96 See, for instance, chapter 11 of the South African interim Constitution (1993), allowing the 
establishment of Volkstaat by Boer and Afrikaneers minorities. On the inclusive character of 
South African constitution making see A. Lollini, Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice in 
South Africa (2010, Berghahan Books), ch. 2. 
97 Szikinger, above n. 62, 408. Of course, one can argue that the Spanish and the South African 
examples are scarcely pertinent given that Hungary had already gone through those initial stages 
of constitutional transition. Yet, the fact that Hungary could be situated at a more advanced stage 
of its transition does not seem to exempt it from an equally considerate approach to constitution 
making. Indeed, only by observing similarly inclusive principles in constitutional politics could 
the constitution claim to be the achievement of the people of Hungary rather than of a contingent 
ruling coalition. 
98 Similarly pompous is the text of the ‘proclamation on statement of national co-operation’ 
approved by the Parliament immediately after the elections, see Kovács, Tóth, above n. 89, 196. 
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the need of a re-foundation.99 Similar language would justify a clear rupture 
with previous constitutional experience. Yet, in closing provision n. 2, we 
read also that “the Parliament shall adopt the Fundamental Law pursuant to 
Sections 19 (3) a) and 24 (3) of Act XX of 1949”, which is the (invalidated) 1949 
Constitution. The impression of an irredeemable contradiction is difficult to 
dispel and the obvious question to be asked is: if the Fundamental Law had to 
be the product of a revolution and a new social contract, why following the 
previous discredited and allegedly invalid constitution? Fidesz and its 
coalition partner ground the legitimacy of their constitutional deed in their 
capacity to fulfil the legal requirement prescribed for constitutional 
revision.100 We may suppose that had they received a lower majority, they 
probably would have not dared to embark on a constitutional undertaking or, 
if they did, they would have tried harder to involve opposition parties. As 
said, all this is perfectly in line with the letter of previous constitutional rules, 
but it is precisely this attachment to legality that is suspect for a constitution 
that from its preamble proclaim no less than the invalidity of the previous 
constitutional regime. Arguably, if the ruling coalition really perceived that 
there was consensus in the society for a revolution of the constitutional 
regime, if it thought that there were really sufficient energies around to break 
with the past and establish a new social and political order, it could have 
simply disregarded previous norms on constitutional amendment and, for 
instance, call a referendum to ratify the Fundamental Law. The very fact that 
this did not happen and that legal continuity was retained is telling. To a 
closer look, legality is all that Hungarian constitution makers can claim in 
support of their constitutional deed. That is why they try to camouflage the 
legality of their text as legitimacy, and that is why they need to stick, for sure 
                                                        
99 For a more detailed analysis of the National Avowal, see below section 3.2. 
100 The point is made in Trócsányi, above n. 89, 8-9. 
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reluctantly, with the previous constitutional order, while pretending they are 
disposing of it.  
Admittedly, it cannot be ruled out that with the passing of time the 
importance of the process leading to the adoption of the Fundamental Law 
will become relative and that its text will be embraced by a wider spectrum of 
political forces.101 But also those who downplay the contribution of process to 
the legitimacy of a constitution admit that ex post legitimacy requires a text 
fulfilling democratic and constitutional credentials.102 This is what needs to be 
ascertained by looking at whether the Fundamental Law, irrespective of its 
biased genesis, put in place textual resources sufficient to arouse collective 
identification. 
 
3.2. Strategic ideological re-traditionalisation 
A good place to start this insight is looking at the ideological dimension of the 
Fundamental Law and, in this respect, the National Avowal is undoubtedly 
the most immediate reference. A text of literary and quasi-religious tone,103 
the National Avowal merges religious and patriotic motives in a prevailingly 
retrospective narrative. The text employs a celebrative register, revealing an 
inclination towards condescending rather than self-examining nation 
building. In this document, the reader can easily detect an exercise of 
ideological re-traditionalisation104 proposing an idealised narrative about the 
customs and values of the Hungarian people. 
                                                        
101 Ibidem, 9. 
102 A. Jakab, ‘On the Legitimacy of a New Constitution. Remarks on the Occasion of the New 
Hungarian Basic Law of 2011’, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033624 , 8-10. 
103 Horkay Hörcher, above n. 93, 30-32 
104 M. Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalization?’, in Loughlin, Dobner (eds), above n. 4, 52. 
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Sure, the invention of tradition is a widespread phenomenon, particularly 
frequent in periods of rapid transformation of the society.105 Tradition is felt as 
providing the symbols of social cohesion and belongingness to a 
community;106 it can also help to divert the attention from existing tensions 
and encourage the acceptance of the status quo. Paradoxically, ideological re-
traditionalisation is a prevailingly modern phenomenon. As Hobsbawm 
notes, “modern nations … claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in 
the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human 
communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion”.107 
Much of this could apply to the Fundamental Law and its National Avowal, 
but it is particularly Hobsbawm’s reference to the natural, its capacity to 
enable self-assertion and exempt a polity from other justifications that seems 
useful to decipher the role of tradition in the Hungarian context. One should 
not be misled by the turn to kitsch and the melancholic tone of the National 
Avowal. Aesthetics only superficially performs a celebrative and consolatory 
role; its function is more strategic and is deeply connected with the genesis of 
the document. As seen, pluralist constitutions as a rule may vaunt the 
historical support of the main political forces and cultures present in a polity, 
but for Hungarian constitution makers this source of legitimacy had become 
unavailable. Self-assertion was the only remaining option and tapping into 
tradition and its natural aura turned out as the most convenient way to 
proceed.  
If this is true, it is the impossibility to claim the support of the people, i.e. the 
actual political community including the opposition, to justify the abundant 
references to history and Hungarian values in the National Avowal. More in 
                                                        
105 E. Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’, in E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (eds), The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 4. 
106 Ibidem, 9. 
107 Ibidem, 14 (Italic added). 
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particular, it can be argued that the National Avowal offers substitutes for 
both the people and the compromise between its constituent parties. In this 
light one should read the strong emphasis on the nation, the fictitious entity 
behind which the ruling coalition stands for the whole community, and 
intergenerational solidarity, the notion replacing the agreement between 
opposing political forces. As will be shown, both concepts generate a 
potentially illiberal sort of nationalism that is likely to obstacle the type of 
collective identification associated with the idea of pluralist constitution.  
First, the nation: The National Avowal is framed as a proclamation in which 
the subject speaking is “We, the members of the Hungarian nation”. The 
formula is repeated obsessively throughout the text with a clear intention to 
create a mythic aura around the Fundamental Law. As said, the strategy is by 
no means original as it harks back to 19th century constitutionalism, where 
concepts such as the nation or sovereignty figured prominently in 
constitutional rhetoric to strengthen the political body. Critically, also in that 
context sovereignty and nation performed a strategic function for it was 
through them that particular political forces could objectify their dominance 
and confer it legal shape.108 Much of this can be found now in the National 
Avowal. Behind invocations of the Hungarian nation, it is easy to see the 
attempt to stir up the country in a difficult historical moment, but it is also 
possible to notice Fidesz and its coalition partner standing for the whole 
polity in the hope of perpetuating their particular values and policy goals.109  
In this titanic effort of self-assertion, further resources are mobilised. The first 
obvious candidate is religion. The text opens with God’s blessing, and goes on 
evoking episodes of Hungary’s Christian history such as the foundation by 
                                                        
108 Zagrebelsky, above n. 9, 356. 
109 Tellingly, the National Avowal opens with the following words: “We, the Members of the 
Hungarian nation, at the beginning of the new millennium, with a sense of responsibility for every 
Hungarian, hereby proclaim the following …” (Italic added). 
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Saint Stephen or the struggles to defend Christian Europe. The most 
outspoken association of nation and religion, however, comes with the 
recognition of “the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood” – a passage 
that portrays Hungary not only as a community of fate, but also a community 
of faith.  
A further contribution in specifying the characters of the Hungarian nation is 
offered by culture. Also in this respect the National Avowal is lavish with 
references to the “outstanding intellectual achievements of the Hungarian 
people” and Hungary’s unique language, culture and man-made and natural 
assets. This leads to reclaim the “intellectual and spiritual unity” of the nation 
“torn apart in the storms of the last century” – probably a reference to the 
Treaty of Trianon in which Hungary lost three quarters of its territory and 
more than half of its population.  
Imbued with religious and cultural contents, the Hungarian nation manifests 
itself to its members and the outside world in more assertive terms than 
before. All the elements recalled do not necessarily impede a serious 
commitment to democracy and the rule of law – religion,110 culture111 and the 
recognition and support of nationals abroad112 appear conspicuously also in 
other European pluralist constitutions. Yet, other elements contained in the 
National Avowal justify some concern and, taken together, may explain the 
preoccupied reactions aroused by the Fundamental Law. 
                                                        
110 See, e.g., § 4 of the Constitutional Act of Denmark, the preamble of the Irish Constitution, 
article 3 of the Greek Constitution, articles 1-3 of the Constitution of Malta and, of course, the 
place of the Church of England in England.  
111 See, e.g., the references to language in articles 2 of the French Constitution and 8 of the Irish 
Constitution. 
112 See, e.g., articles 48, 56 and 57 of the Italian Constitution. 
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For one, the emphatic language employed regarding the rights of the 
Hungarians leaving abroad113 has made neighbouring countries nervous 
about the possibility of interferences by the Hungarian government in their 
territory.114 Some doubt can also be expressed regarding the role assigned to 
Christianity in nation building. Even those inclined to recognise a role in the 
public sphere to religion may agree that in the Fundamental Law Christian 
values are overemphasised. Of course, the National Avowal does not omit to 
“value” other religious traditions – a term that probably means more than 
‘tolerate’ but, probably, also less than recognising an equal role in nation 
building.  
Other passages are similarly exposed to exclusionary interpretations. That on 
nationalities is probably the most ambiguous. The National Avowal declares: 
“the nationalities living with us form part of the Hungarian political 
community and are constituent parts of the State”. The passage echoes article 
68 of the 1989 Constitution and, on its face, it seems a rather innocuous 
petition, even one pointing to an open conception of the political community: 
nationalities, we are told, form part of the polity. To a closer look, however, 
the sentence contrasts with the conception of the political community 
postulated in 1989. This emerges first by looking at the part of article 68 
discarded by the National Avowal: “the national and ethnic minorities living 
in the Republic of Hungary share the power of the people”. A plain reading of 
the text testifies that back in 1989 national and ethnic minorities were 
constituent parts of a polity conceived in essentially civic terms; as such, they 
shared the power of the people. According to the new formula, nationalities 
remain constituent parts of the state and of the Hungarian political 
                                                        
113 See also article D. 
114 ‘Slovakia on edge as Hungary passes a new Constitution’ The Daily.SK, available at 
http://www.thedaily.sk/slovakia-on-edge-as-hungary-passes-new-constitution/  
The ‘Partisan Constitution’ 
  32
community,115 but they no longer share the power of the people. The omission 
is all the more relevant if one considers that, in the meantime, the nature of 
the people has undergone considerable change. In the National Avowal the 
people has become “we, the members of the Hungarian nation”, the putative 
author of the Fundamental Law. Nationalities are not part of it as they are 
constituent parts only of a different entity, the “Hungarian political 
community”. It is not entirely clear what one should make of the distinction 
between “Hungarian nation” and “Hungarian political community” and, 
correspondingly, what consequences for nationalities could follow from it. On 
the one hand, that seems an inoffensive formula as in no part of the 
constitution individuals belonging to nationalities are restricted in their 
political rights. On the other hand, as far as polity building is concerned they 
are downgraded to an inferior position for they cannot claim to be part of the 
subject proclaiming the National Avowal and establishing the new 
constitutional regime. This sheds a dim light on status and rights of the 
individuals belonging to nationalities: are they still fully-fledged political 
subjects or have they become second-class citizens with no role in 
constitutional politics? Are they still individuals endowed with fundamental 
rights or have they become subjects benefiting from some generous 
concessions by the Hungarian nation? The text renders plausible both 
scenarios, but one thing is rather clear: from a symbolical point of view, 
nationalities receive a treatment equivalent to that reserved to non-Christian 
religious traditions. Once the people acquires a more assertive ethnic and 
cultural connotation, cultural and religious minorities are pushed at the 
border of the political community and relegated to enclaves. This is not just 
speculation because in the quoted passage nationalities are also described as 
“living with us”, i.e. living with “we, the member of the Hungarian nation”. It 
                                                        
115 See also article XXIX. 
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might certainly be that this is just unfortunate drafting, and perhaps one 
should not read too much into a single sentence. Yet, one should also not 
forget that language is open to interpretation even beyond the intentions of its 
authors and, more worryingly, that also the collective unconscious may 
manifest itself in slips of the pen. 
Strong weight on intergenerational solidarity – the temporal projection of the 
nation – is the other strategy put forward to disguise the absence of a demos 
sustaining the Fundamental Law. Also this concept is expressed loudly: “our 
Fundamental Law … shall be a covenant among Hungarians past, present 
and future; a living framework which expresses the nation’s will and the form 
in which we want to live.” This concept leads the National Avowal to exhume 
the doctrine of the Holy Crown and flirt with evolutionary 
constitutionalism;116 but this is also the passage summing up the abundant 
references to future generations included in the text.117 Both dimensions of 
intergenerational solidarity – the past and the future – perform a strategic 
function; yet, it is in particular the approach to past history that is worth 
exploring to unearth the ideological profile of the Fundamental Law and its 
potential for abuse. 
Pride is the first sentiment towards national history inspiring Hungarian 
constitution makers. Celebration of the past is a rather common motif in 
public rhetoric meant to reinforce self-esteem118 through idealization and 
                                                        
116 The idea was famously exposed in E. Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution [1790], 
paragraph 165, with the following words: “As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained 
in many generations, [the state] becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, 
but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born”. 
117 The National Avowals declares: “We bear responsibility for our descendants; therefore we 
shall protect the living conditions of future generations by making prudent use of our material, 
intellectual and natural resources” and “we trust in a jointly-shaped future and the commitment 
of younger generations. We believe that our children and grandchildren will make Hungary great 
again …” 
118 Horkay Hörcher, above n. 93, 30. 
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moralistic discourses.119 With its extensive references to history, the National 
Avowal goes a long way into glorifying Hungarians’ deeds and 
achievements. This narrative, however, is not exhausted in celebration of the 
past, and other parts of the text express a different mood.  
The other sentiment figuring conspicuously in the National Avowal is 
victimhood. References to foreign occupations abound, leaving the reader 
with a deep sense of the suffering inflicted on Hungarians by Nazi and 
Communist occupiers. Arguably, it is in this respect that the National Avowal 
manifests itself as a genuinely contemporary artefact. Memory studies have 
recently observed that nationalisms are no longer interested in narratives of 
heroic martyrdom.120 Due to the sympathy aroused on a global scale by 
innocent victims, narratives of victimhood have become more popular. This 
has given birth to ‘victimhood nationalism’, a specific form of nationalism 
relying on the memory of collective suffering and having in the sacralisation 
of memories its epistemological mainstay.121 
Undoubtedly, Hungary suffered enormously both the involvement in World 
War II and Communism, thus tribute to victims is not only justified but it is 
also a good way to start dealing with the past. Reverence to victims, however, 
should not make us blind to their possible strategic exploitation. As Lim 
notes, “victimhood nationalism [does not] necessarily mean to pay homage to 
concrete victims. What is at issue is not the agony and anguish of concrete 
victims but the idea of abstract victimhood”.122 In this idea and in their unique 
past, “nationalists can find a mental enclave where they can enjoy a morally 
comfortable position, very often disregarding the fact that the[se] heirs of 
                                                        
119 Mouffe, above n. 16, 74-75. 
120 J-H. Lim, ‘Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global 
Accountability’, in A. Assmann, S. Conrad (eds), Memory in a Global Age. Discourses, Practices and 
Trajectories (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 138. 
121 Ibidem, 139-140. 
122 Ibidem, 147-148. 
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historical victimhood have become today’s perpetrators”.123 To the eyes of 
reckless rulers, victimhood may be even more attractive than heroic 
nationalism. The status of victim offers several concrete advantages: it hides 
or confuses responsibility for the past; it confounds the often ambiguous and 
complex relationships existing between victims and victimizers; it waives or 
eschews responsibility for the present by proclaiming collective innocence.124 
Most of all, victimhood nationalism prevents the criticism of sceptics and 
outsiders,125 granting immunity or, at least, justification for future abuses.126 
It is therefore against this background that the references to past occupations 
in the National Avowal could also be read. If this is done, several passages 
may sound suspicious. For instance, it is said that the country lost its self-
determination on 19 March 1944 – a statement that, by alluding to Nazi 
occupation, provides also a tactical waiver for the atrocities perpetrated by 
the Hungarian collaborationist regime in the final months of World War II. 
Similarly, the National Avowal exculpates Hungarians also from other 
responsibilities. It is said that from 1944 to 1990 there was no self-
determination. As known, this is in large part true and the bloody 
suppression of the 1956 uprising is there to testimony that Hungarians did try 
to resist and overthrow foreign occupation. The same sentence, however, goes 
also in a dangerous direction when it seems to imply that no Hungarian was 
involved in tyrannical rule127. This sense of collective innocence is reinforced if 
one looks at the omissions of the National Avowal. In a narrative so rich of 
historical references, it is striking that all the interwar period is overlooked, 
                                                        
123 Ibidem, 140. 
124 Ibidem, 148. 
125 Ibidem, 140. 
126 I. Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
9. 
127 The Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law has introduced article U, declaring the 
responsibility of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and its leaders for foreign occupation 
and other crimes committed prior to 1989. 
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leaving the reader wonder on what Hungarians ought to think of the ‘White 
Terror’ or a controversial figure such as Miklós Horthy. Is that a period for 
which Hungarians can be proud? Or should it also be included in the 
“decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay”? 
It is difficult to predict the impact of the National Avowal on Hungarian 
public discourse. From its tone, it seems unlikely that it will encourage a 
process of self-examination and critical reconsideration of the past. Its 
condescending register and self-pitying predisposition may nourish a 
dangerous inclination to sentimentalise the past and derive consolation from 
it, while remaining politically passive in the present.128 Another possibility is 
that the combination of pride and victimhood, especially in a period of 
economic distress, will produce a toxic political environment corroding the 
quality of democratic and civic life. But to discover the potential for abuse 
inherent in the Fundamental Law, one does not need to speculate too much 
on such looming scenarios. Other elements in the National Avowal already 
indicate that the strategies pursued to disguise the contested genesis of the 
Fundamental Law come at a high price in terms of democratic and 
constitutional viability. 
Indeed, a sense of thick and exclusionary communitarianism exudes from the 
Fundamental Law. As usual, this is expressed loudly in the National Avowal 
with references to nothing less than a moral palingenesis after decades of 
decay.129 In this context, conservative values are proclaimed 
uncompromisingly: “we hold that the family and the nation constitute the 
principal framework of our coexistence, and that our fundamental cohesive 
values are fidelity, faith and love”. This bold assertion preludes to more 
                                                        
128 Müller, above n. 27, 112. 
129 Also the section codifying the ideological underpinnings of the Fundamental Law is eloquently 
named “Foundation”. 
Marco Dani 
37   
 
specific clauses defining the marriage only in its heterosexual version130 and 
protecting embryonic and foetal life from the moment of conception.131 Other 
provisions substantiate this communitarian shift.132 We learn from the 
National Avowal that “[…] the strength of the community and the honour of 
each person are based on labour […]” and that “[…] individual freedom can 
only be complete in cooperation with others”. The individualist paradigm is 
rejected and replaced with a more vocal and engaged notion of citizenship. 
Accordingly, Hungarians not only have a right but also an obligation to legal 
resistance,133 and the same applies to work.134 Within this mind-set, employees 
and employers are expected to cooperate on behalf of national economy.135 
This and other ideas136 give a corporatist flavour to the constitution – an 
impression reinforced also by another part of the text encouraging regular 
physical exercise.137  
To be sure, nothing of this is per se wrong or authoritarian, and much could be 
said in favour of conceptions of freedom alternative to individualism, let 
alone of regular physical exercise. It is the sum of all these and the above 
elements to seem potentially illiberal. The National Avowal and the 
Fundamental Law depicts the good Hungarian citizen as someone who lives 
in an heterosexual family, has children, does sport, cherishes the environment 
and national culture, participates cooperatively in work and, although 
sceptical of social conflicts, tolerates pluralism and enjoys liberal freedoms 
                                                        
130 Article L. See also article 1 of the Fourth Amendment. 
131 Article II. 
132 See Horkay Hörcher, above n. 93, 38, identifying in this regard a “[…] shift of emphasis from 
the defence of individual rights to a double focus on the defence of both individual rights and the 
socio-political values of the whole political community […]. 
133 Article C. 
134 Article XII. 
135 Article XVII. 
136 See, e.g., article XVI (4), “adult children shall be obliged to look after their parents if they are in 
need”. 
137 Article XX. 
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(but without exceeding). In other words, the constitution does not portray the 
identikit of a dangerous enemy of civic values, but the more common and 
normally benign image of the average supporter of Fidesz and its coalition 
partner – an image to which probably most European conservatives could 
subscribe.138 Precisely for this reason doubts can be cast about the capacity of 
this document to promote collective identification beyond the ranks of 
Hungarian conservatives. This goes to the social legitimacy of the 
Fundamental Law, but also to the quality of democratic and civil life that 
Hungarians will enjoy in the next years. It is often when alternative life styles 
are marginalised, minority worldviews disenfranchised and, more generally, 
the room for deviancy enlarged that conflicts risk becoming intractable and 
social bonds weakened. 
 
3.3. The ‘efficient part’ of the Partisan constitution: continuity and corrosion 
There is a lot in the ideological apparatus of the Fundamental Law justifying a 
worried assessment, and the fact that constitutional provisions are to be 
interpreted in accordance with the National Avowal is all the more 
alarming.139 Legitimate concern for the ideological stance of the constitution, 
however, should not distract from an overall evaluation of the text. 
Paraphrasing Bagehot,140 it might well be that the ‘dignified part’ of the 
Fundamental Law fails in exciting and preserving the reverence of (all) the 
people; yet, its ‘efficient part’ could still offer an institutional setting that, 
relieved of ideological burdens, allows the operation of a constitutional 
democracy. It is this last hypothesis that needs to be verified prior to 
                                                        
138 J-W. Müller, ‘The Hungarian Tragedy’ (2011) Dissent, 8, refers to the concept of Bürgerlichkeit. 
139 Article R (3). 
140 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution [1867] (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5. 
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dismissing the Fundamental Law as entirely contradicting European 
constitutional culture. 
Once this standpoint is taken, a good deal of continuity can be detected 
between the efficient part of the Fundamental Law and the previous 
constitutional setting.141 Principles such as democracy, rule of law and 
separation of powers are confirmed, and also the protection of fundamental 
rights is reasserted through a catalogue that seems largely consistent with the 
ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.142 EU membership is 
reaffirmed143 and also international cooperation is widely supported.144 In 
certain constitutional norms there is language to soften some of the most 
assertive passages of the National Avowal. This is the case of religion: 
whereas the National Avowal prioritises Christianity for the purpose of 
nation building, article VII provides a plain formulation of the principles of 
freedom of and from religion and separation between the State and 
Churches.145 A more pluralist posture emerges also in the socio-economic 
sphere, where the constitution lays down a rather conventional list of 
economic freedoms146 and social rights.147 The same can be said about the 
fundamental traits of the institutional architecture. True, the powers and 
responsibility of the President of the Republic have been probably 
                                                        
141 For a similar assessment, see A. Arato, ‘Orbán’s (Counter-) Revolution of the Voting Booth and 
How it was Made Possible’, in http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/orbans-counter-revolution-of-
the-voting-booth-and-how-it-was-made-possible/ (last visited May 2013). 
142 To a closer look, also in this respect some deficiency can be identified. For instance, article VIII 
(2)-(5) recognises freedom of association with no limit for armed political organizations (see, 
instead, article 63 (2) of the 1989 Constitution). It seems, however, that similar lacunae can be 
overcome through interpretation also with reference to international human rights treaties. 
143 Article E. 
144 Article Q. 
145 In this respect, the formula employed in article VII is more advanced than that used in article 
60 (3) of the 1989 Constitution. More worringly, Act CCVI of 2011 (Act on Churches) has made 
the recognition of churches conditional on prior approval by the parliament by a two-thirds 
majority. 
146 Articles XII (freedom of enterprise) and XIII (right to property). 
147 Articles XI (right to education), XII (right/duty to work), XV (equality), XIX (social security), 
XXII (housing). 
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increased,148 but the Parliament retains its role of “supreme body of popular 
representation”,149 with legislative, budgetary and controlling powers on 
government. Finally, also the role of the Constitutional Court, despite 
important changes to its composition and modalities of access, seems 
confirmed and broadly consistent with European standards.150 
Should we therefore conclude that, beyond all the fuss about ideology, the 
Fundamental Law is in line with European constitutional culture? 
Unfortunately not. There are at least three areas in which also the efficient 
part of the Fundamental Law runs afoul of the idea of a pluralist constitution, 
thus revealing that corrosion has undermined deeper strata of the 
constitutional structure. 
The organisation of the judiciary is the first area in which the constitutional 
structure may be found wanting. This is only in part attributable to the 
Fundamental Law for, when it comes to courts the constitutional text is rather 
laconic. In particular, the prerogatives of judges and the administration of 
courts receive scant discipline from the constitution, leaving to a largely 
unconstrained legislature the power to intervene. The perils of allowing such 
broad latitude to Parliament have soon materialised. Legislation has assigned 
the administration of courts to a National Office for the Judiciary, a one-
person body of dubious independence which, under unspecified 
circumstances, has the power to move legal cases between courts. Other 
legislative norms betray the inclination of the current ruling coalition to 
interfere with the judiciary and other independent authorities. Among these, 
                                                        
148 See articles 9 (3) and (5). 
149 Article 1, echoing the formula employed in article 19 of the 1989 Constitution.  
150 The most strident exception is perhaps article 37 (4), restricting judicial review of legislation 
on statutes involving public finance as long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic 
Product. More limitations to the powers of the Constitutional Court have been introduced by 
articles 12, 17 and 19 of the Fourth Amendment. 
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the provision lowering judges’ retirement age from 70 to 62 stands out.151 
Presented as a move to rejuvenate the judicial branch, the norm has been 
rapidly unmasked as an awkward attempt to dispose of experienced judges 
on behalf of a cohort of younger government loyalists. 
Another field in which the Fundamental Law departs dramatically from the 
idea of a pluralist constitution are its frequent references to cardinal laws, i.e. 
acts of Parliament requiring the approval of a two-thirds majority.152 As seen, 
already the 1989 Constitution made large use of this tool,153 a choice soon 
regarded as “an irrational obstacle to effective government action”.154 In the 
context of the Fundamental Law, charges of irrationality could seem even 
more justified: why on earth assigning to consensual decision-making the task 
of detailing partisan constitutional norms such as those on family?155 Isn’t this 
an absurd reversal of the logic inherent in pluralist constitutions, whereby 
consensual decision-making is for constitutional principles and partisanship 
for their articulation? Isn’t this a way to co-opt political minorities into the 
implementation of a biased normative project? Much of this may be true on a 
theoretical level, but at a practical one the idea of expanding the use of 
cardinal laws corresponds to lucid political strategy. In the current political 
environment, references to cardinal laws are no longer to be associated with 
consensual decision-making. Rather, they can best be viewed as references to 
the contingent parliamentary majority that will have the first word in 
implementing the constitution. Only in a subsequent period, when probably 
no one else will be able to aggregate a comparable majority, will the 
consensual nature of cardinal laws be revived, granting a veto position to 
                                                        
151 See cardinal law n. 162/2011. 
152 Article T (4). 
153 See above section 2.3. 
154 Paczolay, above n. 61, 569. 
155 See article L (3). 
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current rulers. In analysing this aspect, therefore, one should not be misled by 
comparisons on the quantity of references to cardinal laws contained in the 
Fundamental Law and the 1989 Constitution – yes, numbers are roughly 
similar. What is crucial to understand is that by means of cardinal laws, the 
current political majority is empowered to entrench its preferences on critical 
institutional issues156 and, perhaps more controversially, on the definition of 
civil rights157 and policy issues normally left to majoritarian political 
competition.158 Underlying this use of cardinal laws, therefore, is an 
opportunistic approach to representative institutions, one that not only 
devalues the idea of competitive democracy but that establishes also the 
premises for future political inaction and rapid obsolescence of legislation. 
Disdain for democratic decision-making emerges also from other aspects of 
the constitutional setting, namely the architecture built around the state 
budget. In this respect, the constitution expresses a clear pro-austerity stance. 
This is evident in article 36 (4), where the Parliament is prevented from 
adopting a budget act allowing state debt to rise above half of the Gross 
Domestic Product. This notion is reinforced in article 36 (5), requiring 
Parliament to reduce state debt as long as this exceeds that threshold.159 
Respect of these rules is not entrusted only to the Parliament and the 
Constitutional Court. The Fundamental Law institutes the Budget Council, a 
technocratic body assisting the Parliament in its legislative and budgetary 
activities.160 Tasks of the Budget Council are controlling that the budget meets 
                                                        
156 See, e.g., the references in article 5 (7), on the rules of procedure of Parliament, and article 25 
(7) on the organisation and administration of courts. 
157 See, e.g., article G (1) and (4) on citizenship. 
158 This is the case of articles 38 and 40, on the use of national assets, taxation and pensions. 
159 Only Article 36 (6), for cases of enduring economic recession, mitigates the rigour of the 
preceding paragraphs. 
160 Article 44. The Budget Council is composed of three members: its President, appointed for six 
years by the President of the Republic, the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary, appointed 
for six years by the President of the Republic (art. 41 (2)) and the President of the State Audit 
Office, elected for twelve years by a two-thirds parliamentary majority (art. 43 (2)). 
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article 36 requirements on state debt and, if so, consenting to it. Without 
consent of the Budget Council, the state budget act cannot be adopted,161 a 
circumstance this that may have far-reaching consequences on the democratic 
process well beyond budgetary issues. Indeed, if the Parliament fails to adopt 
the budget by 31 March, the President of the Republic may dissolve it.162 With 
the Parliament under such a constant technocratic threat, it is easy to predict 
that the political process will be infantilised and the room for legitimate 
political contestation even more restricted.  
In the end, this seems the crude reality from which massive doses of 
nationalist propaganda tend to divert popular attention. Once ideology is set 
aside, the text portrays only a debilitated form of constitutional democracy in 
which the rule of law is weakened and the political process emasculated. 
What the Fundamental Law has on offer is just a recipe for rampant 
nationalism and austere technocracy, hardly for a vibrant constitutional 
democracy. That is why, even after an analysis of its efficient part, doubts on 
its capacity to generate the sort of collective identification associated with the 
idea of pluralist constitution seem all the more founded. 
 
4. Dilemmas of conditionality post enlargement 
In Europe, constitution making is no longer an undertaking carried out in 
isolation by national communities. Although national sovereignty remains a 
pillar of democratic political and legal orders, its exercise is subject to a 
variety of constraints reflecting the broader range of principles characterising 
European constitutional culture. Different international and transnational 
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institutions oversee constitutional politics in accordance with distinct 
mandates and styles of intervention. Their characteristics and effectiveness 
have been tested during the approval and implementation of the 
Fundamental Law. 
 
4.1. Soft Constitutionalism 
The exercise of constitution making power is first of all conditioned by ‘soft 
constitutionalism’, the supervisory activity carried out by the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law operating at the Council of Europe 
(hereinafter: ‘Venice Commission’). Entrusted with the task of giving legal 
advice on the democratic functioning of institutions, the Venice Commission 
is often requested to scrutinise constitutional politics in the light of the ECHR 
and European standards of democracy and rule of law.163 This has occurred 
also in the case of Hungary, where the new constitution and its implementing 
acts have originated a series of opinions touching upon several of their most 
controversial aspects.164 Although this is still an on-going process, the merits 
(and flaws) of soft constitutionalism can already be assessed in particular with 
reference to the two opinions issued on the Fundamental Law.165 
No institution better than the Venice Commission has highlighted the 
criticalities of the new Hungarian Constitution. Firstly, it has censured the 
process leading to its adoption. Already in its first opinion, the Venice 
Commission manifests openly its unease for a process in which opposition 
                                                        
163 Article 1, Resolution (2002)3, Revised Statute for the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law. 
164 The complete list of opinions issued by the Venice Commission on Hungary is available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?country=17&year=all (last visited October 
2013). 
165 These are the “Opinion on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the new 
constitution of Hungary” (Opinion no. 614/2011), 28 March 2011, and the “Opinion on the new 
constitution of Hungary” (Opinion no. 621/2011), 20 June 2011. 
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parties were excluded, transparency and public deliberation were not 
ensured, civil society was inadequately consulted. All these elements led the 
Commission to conclude that they key requirements of a democratic 
constitution making process were not satisfied.166 Secondly, the broad usage 
of cardinal laws is blamed and suggestion is made to enlarge the scope for 
majoritarian politics.167 Thirdly, the Venice Commission expresses concern 
also for the weakening of the powers of parliamentary majorities and the 
prerogatives of the Constitutional Court in the field of public finances.168 
Many other institutional aspects are examined and, among these, also the 
National Avowal is object of specific analysis. The Venice Commission does 
not openly engage with the ideology and ethos inspiring this document. Its 
opinion retains a strictly legal register and explores a number of aspects 
which could make the interpretation of constitutional norms according to the 
National Avowal problematic.169 The vagueness of certain concepts is 
censured as well as the possible implications of the declaration of invalidity of 
the 1949 constitution. In addition, concerns are raised over the axiological 
thickness of the document and its potential extra-territorial effects. 
Thus, much could be said in favour of the activity performed by the Venice 
Commission in respect of the Fundamental Law: its opinions are authoritative 
and many of its suggestions, if listened to, could have contributed to a more 
considerate exercise of constitutional politics. The fact that this did not 
happen, however, is proof of the limits of soft constitutionalism. There is, 
indeed, an inverse relationship between the quality of the opinions issued by 
the Venice Commission and their legal and political impact. Its first Opinion, 
for instance, suggested that openness and spirit of compromise ought to be 
                                                        
166 Opinion 614/2011, above n. 165, § 15-19 and 71-73. 
167 Opinion 621/2011, above n. 165, § 24-27. 
168 Ibidem, § 89 and 120-129. 
169 Ibidem, § 34-40. 
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the principles inspiring constitution making170 but, as noted, Hungarian 
constitution makers carried on indifferent to such admonition. Sure, the 
solutions suggested by soft constitutionalism may reveal influential beyond 
constitutional politics, for instance inspiring judicial interpretations of the 
Fundamental Law or political and academic debate on it. Conscious of its 
limited role, the Venice Commission has invested most of its energies in the 
analysis of the bill of rights, suggesting interpretations in the light of the 
ECHR that could probably redress some of the most questionable provisions 
inserted in the Fundamental Law.171 These are precious pieces of advice and it 
would be difficult to demand more from an institution whose mandate is just 
to provide legal assistance. Beyond rights adjudication, however, the problem 
of redressing partisan constitution making or, at least, curbing its most 
hideous implications remains and justifies the intervention of another set of 
institutions. 
 
4.2. The EU political dead end 
By becoming members of the EU, member states have contracted an 
obligation to respect its fundamental values.172 This applies also to national 
constitution making for that obligation is all-comprehensive and extends 
beyond the fields covered by the EU Charter of fundamental rights. Interest of 
the EU, its member states and European citizens on the respect of values such 
as democracy, rule of law and pluralism rests on different assumptions. 
Firstly, there is a general interest of all these actors in the moral and political 
integrity of the Union, an aspect relevant also to its international credibility 
                                                        
170 Opinion 614/2011, above n. 165, § 73. 
171 See, e.g., § 66-67, on the balance between the freedom of the mother and the rights of the 
unborn child; § 69-70, on life imprisonment without parole and § 75-80 on the prohibition of 
discriminations on the ground of sexual orientation. 
172 Articles 2 and 49 TEU. 
Marco Dani 
47   
 
and that of its member states.173 Secondly, respect of those fundamental values 
is instrumental to a correct functioning of free movement and the area of 
freedom, security and justice for breaches of fundamental rights may deter 
movement towards a jurisdiction and encourage migration towards others.174 
Finally, national compliance with fundamental values has an important 
bearing also on the democratic quality of Union. National institutions are 
structurally involved in supranational decision making and, as such, there is 
also a collective interest in preventing them from poisoning with toxic 
elements the EU legal and political process. For all these reasons, EU member 
states have conferred to the Union the task of contrasting slides into 
authoritarianism. According to article 7 TEU, in case of risk of a serious 
breach, the Council can pressure a member state into respecting fundamental 
values, or sanction it if that risk materialises. This is part of the EU civilising 
mission towards national polities, a system of pre-commitment responding to 
the interests of both individual member states and the Union at large.175 
In the light of the above analysis, it could safely be argued that in the case of 
the new Hungarian constitution at least a risk of serious breach had 
materialised. Yet, activating article 7 is not an easy process, given the broad 
margins of political discretion granted to the institutions involved.176 Several 
arguments could be advanced in support of opening an article 7 procedure. 
For one, EU monitoring and the threat of future sanctions could have helped 
                                                        
173 Article 3 (5) TEU. 
174 See the Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-380/05, Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle 
Comunicazioni e Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni and Direzione Generale 
Autorizzazioni e Concessioni Ministero delle Comunicazioni [2008] ECR I-349, § 20-22. See also D. 
Sarmiento, ‘The EU’s Constitutional Core’, in A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National 
Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia, 2013), 193-195.  
175 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 336-343. See 
also R. Keohane, S. Macedo, A. Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’ (2009) 63 
International Organization, 1. 
176 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “on Article 
7 of the Treaty on the European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the 
Union is based” COM (2003) 606 final, 5-6. 
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if not at the stage of constitution making, at least at those of amendment, 
implementation and interpretation of the constitution. Then, some degree of 
EU pressure could have supported political minorities in their efforts to 
uphold European constitutional culture in Hungary. Finally, also the 
legitimacy of the EU could have gained from a resolute action in this field, 
showing that the Union is ready to act not only when the Euro is jeopardised, 
but also when it’s fundamental non-economic values are at stake. However, 
cogent reasons could be put forward also against the use of article 7: 
especially in states of recently reacquired sovereignty such as Hungary, 
external pressures are likely to be perceived as illegitimate interferences, thus 
resulting counterproductive for the constitutional democratic cause.  
Be that as it may, EU institutions preferred not to open an article 7 procedure 
against Hungary. There are not official documents stating the reasons for this 
decision. Concerns that a bold EU action could backfire may have certainly be 
influential, alongside doubts about the possibility of reaching the high voting 
thresholds required in the Council and the European Parliament.177 Moreover, 
the political affiliation of Fidesz and its coalition partner with the European 
People Party must have certainly played a role, considering the 
embarrassment that a charge of violation of EU fundamental values would 
have generated for the largest European political party. 
Despite the failure in activating article 7 procedure, EU institutions have not 
remained idle over the new Hungarian constitution. The most vocal reaction 
has come from the European Parliament, where two resolutions censuring the 
Fundamental Law and its implementation have been approved.178 Both the 
                                                        
177 The determination of a clear risk of a serious breach requires a four-fifths majority in the 
Council (art. 7 (1) TEU) and two-thirds of the votes cast representing the majority of the 
component members in the Parliament (art. 354 TFEU). 
178 See European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution 
(2011/2655(RSP)), and European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012 on the recent 
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contents of those documents and the debate leading to their adoption reveal 
all the limits of a purely political approach to such kind of issues.  
First of all, during the debate179 the contents of the Fundamental Law received 
only cursory attention.180 It is rare to find in-depth analyses of its critical 
points, not to mention discussions of them in the light of European 
constitutional culture. Many of the critics preferred to take issue with 
particular aspects of the Fundamental Law to express their own legitimate, 
though equally biased, political beliefs. This is the case, for instance, of the 
norm banning gay-marriage, target of several MEPs attacking what they 
considered discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.181 In their 
statements, no consideration is given to the fact that, on this issue, a European 
consensus is far from being consolidated.182 Their claims seem to be 
formulated to please their particular constituency and not to advocate the 
notion that, on controversial issues, constitutional norms ought to recognise 
rather than decide conflicts. But justified as they seem by the dynamics of 
European politics, such positions are hardly more legitimate than those they 
strive to criticize: it is not by replacing a conservative constitutional norm 
with a liberal one that bias goes away.  
Similarly misguided are the views put forward by the advocates of the 
Fundamental Law. In this camp, two are the main strategies followed by the 
intervening MEPs. The first mirrors the positions expressed by the critics: a 
number of MEPs take the floor just to praise the Fundamental Law as a 
                                                                                                                                                              
political developments in Hungary (2012/2511(RSP)). A further important resolution has been 
approved on July 3 2013. On this development, see below section 6. 
179 European Parliament, debate of 8 June 2011, 11. Revised Hungarian constitution. 
180 Particularly striking is the passage in Resolution 2011/2655 referring to a non existent 
incorporation of the Charter of Nice in the Fundamental Law (see letter h). 
181 See, e.g., the statements by Lunacek and Willmot in the debate of 8 June 2011. 
182 Opinion 621/2011, above n. 165, § 46-50. 
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manifesto for European conservatism.183 Others, instead, follow the slightly 
more sophisticated tactic of “debating the debate”184, i.e. contesting the right 
of the European Parliament to voice its opinion on a newly enacted 
constitution with arguments based on national sovereignty185 or, softer 
version, national diversity.186  
In such a climate, few are the voices following the principles that should 
inspire the Parliament on these issues: respect of national constitution making 
and strong assertion of European values, in particular political pluralism.187 It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the impact of the resolutions has been 
negligible so far. Although their contents incorporate some of the remarks 
made by the Venice Commission, their calls for a new constitution or a more 
inclusive attitude in its implementation have remained dead letter. Indeed, it 
is difficult to believe that the views expressed by the European Parliament 
will have a significant impact beyond the circle of the aficionados of European 
politics and, especially, in Hungary. Given their liberal imprinting, a far more 
realistic scenario is that those resolutions will be felt as another product of an 
elitist cosmopolitanism that, short of political support in Hungary, preaches 
liberal values in an attempt to overrule the products of genuine self-
government.188 
 
                                                        
183 See, e.g., the statements by Manfred Weber and Kurski in the debate of 8 June 2011. 
184 In the words of Tavares, see debate of 8 June 2011. 
185 These are the positions expressed in the debate of 8 June 2001  by the (Hungarian) Presidency 
of the Council, and MEPs from the EPP such as Busuttil, Ader and Brok. 
186 See the statements by Mauro and Gal in the debate of 8 June 2011. 
187 For an isolated exception, see the statement by López Aguilar in the debate of 8 June 2011. 
188 See the statement by Kurski in the debate of 8 June 2011. 
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4.3. Low-profile legalism 
If politics comes to nothing (or little more), what is left is law. This is 
particularly evident in the debate at the Civil Liberties Committee of the 
European Parliament,189 where proposals of opening an article 7 procedure190 
were rejected and, at least for the moment, shelved with the argument that 
“European law must be the cornerstone of [EU] action”.191 The same notion 
resonates also in one of the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament: 
as attention turns to the implementation of the Fundamental Law, its most 
tangible decision is asking the European Commission to intensify control 
through the infringement procedure.192  
This brings in low-profile legalism, currently the main course of EU action 
vis-à-vis the Hungarian legislation implementing the Fundamental Law. On 
January 2012 the Commission has started a series of infringement proceedings 
on several issues including the independence of the national central bank, the 
lowering of the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries, the 
independence of the new data protection authority.193 Compared with the 
political approach and soft constitutionalism, infringements proceedings 
present all the advantages of an essentially legal approach. They are certainly 
more effective then soft constitutionalism for they can result in a judgment 
and, possibly, in fines. Besides, their recourse to legal language avoids the 
political exposure associated with the article 7 procedure. Thus, infringement 
proceedings may well appear as the most appropriate candidate solution to 
                                                        
189 See ‘Civil Liberties Committee debates Hungary’s controversial laws’, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120109IPR35005/html/Civil-
Liberties-Committee-debates-Hungary's-controversial-laws (last visited October 2013). 
190 Ibidem, referring to the proposals put forward by int’Veld, Alfano and Göncz. 
191 Ibidem, referring to the opinions of Voss and Gál. 
192 See Resolution 2012/2511 (RSP), points D and 4. 
193 See ‘European Commission launches accelerated infringement proceedings against Hungary 
over the independence of its central bank and data protection authorities as well as over 
measures affecting the judiciary’, press release 17 January 2012, available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-24_en.htm (last visited October 2013). 
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put pressure on the Hungarian government and redress the most contentious 
aspects of the new constitutional order. 
Yet, low-profile legalism contains also a number of shortcomings. Firstly, 
within the framework of the infringement procedure, the overall debate on 
the Fundamental Law and its implementation is fragmented. Unlike in article 
7, infringement proceedings require the Commission to formulate separately 
its charges through well-targeted initiatives addressing the specific 
criticalities of the constitution and its implementing legislation. Once 
fragmented, the debate on the Fundamental Law loses political and 
constitutional pathos. The problem is no longer the political project behind 
the constitution, its controversial genesis and its potentially negative impact 
on the quality of democratic life in Hungary. As the focus shifts to policing 
single legislative initiatives, the broad picture remains in the background and 
all the discussion is reconfigured in more professional and technical terms.  
This is not only a consequence of the structure of the infringement procedure, 
but also of its ethos. Infringement procedures are notoriously an opaque 
affair. They are carried out through confidential relationships between the 
Commission and the national government, so their distinctive character is that 
of diplomacy and administrative management. This renders low-profile 
legalism a top-down exercise impermeable to political contestation, in which 
disenfranchised parties in Hungarian and European society may at most 
benefit of the vicarious representation by the Commission. 
The drastic depoliticization inherent in low-profile legalism emerges finally in 
the yardstick and the language employed by the Commission in infringement 
proceedings. Analysis and discussion of specific issues are not framed with 
constitutional language, but with the grammar and syntax of EU legislation. 
This results in the transformation of the debate on constitutional democracy 
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into a more detached debate on compliance with EU legislation. In this 
regard, an emblematic example is offered by the infringement procedure 
concerning the lowering of the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and 
notaries. It will be remembered that the issue had been investigated also by 
the Venice Commission, which expressed its criticism with the following 
words: “[…] the Commission finds this measure questionable in the light of 
the core principles and rules pertaining to the independence, the status and 
immovability of judges. According to different sources, this provision entails 
that around 300 of the most experienced judges will be obliged to retire 
within a year. Correspondingly, 300 vacancies will need to be filled. This may 
undermine the operational capacity of courts and affect continuity and legal 
security and might also open the way for undue influence on the composition 
of the judiciary”.194 A totally different approach emerges from the ruling of 
the European Court of Justice on the same issue.195 Here, the case is no longer 
one concerning judicial independence but one of age discrimination. The 
good protected is not the adequate functioning and the independence of the 
judiciary; the lowering of retirement age is treated as a routine labour law 
case, one in which the goods at stake are the professional activity of judges, 
their legitimate expectations on wage and the coherence of the pension 
system. Nowhere in the judgment are the constitutional implications of the 
measure discussed, with the result that the issue is framed and resolved 
against the colder and more dispassionate background of anti-discrimination 
law and proportionality review.196 This is probably the most that the EU 
institutions are able to deliver nowadays: a low-profile legal approach in 
which constitutional culture cannot be defended openly due to the Union’s 
political and constitutional fragility. 
                                                        
194 Opinion 621/2011, above n. 165, § 108. 
195 Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, not yet reported. 
196 Ibidem, respectively at § 48-54 and 55-56. 
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5. The Union’s guilty conscience 
The incapacity of the Union to induce a more considerate exercise of 
constitutional politics in one of its member states requires careful 
consideration. As the Hungarian tragedy advances, most of the comments 
tends to circumscribe the issue and tell the story of a single country 
abandoning European constitutional culture. Of course, more informed 
opinions have also highlighted the difficulties encountered by the Union in 
dealing with conditionality after enlargement, calling for the use of article 7 
TEU or the introduction of more effective and accessible mechanisms to 
reorient Hungary into the correct constitutional path.197 Also these 
contributions, however, share the same assumption: were it not for Hungary, 
European constitutional culture would be healthy and thriving. 
Unfortunately, the situation is more alarming: Hungary is not the black sheep 
of the Union and - what is worse - its situation may be a harbinger of difficult 
times to come for European constitutional culture as a whole. 
My diagnosis is that the Hungarian tragedy reproduces in amplified and 
grotesque form the more profound and pervasive phenomenon of the 
corrosion of European constitutional culture. Thus, rather than looking at the 
partisan constitution as a backward product and a contingent malaise, we 
should study and criticise it as the most emblematical example of a broader 
trend in European legal culture, namely the decline of the idea of pluralist 
constitution. To capture this notion, we should set aside for a moment the 
most vocal aspects of the Fundamental Law, and focus on its critical structural 
element: the confusion between the role of the constitution and the place of 
partisanship or, in other words, the entrenchment in the constitution of a 
                                                        
197 See, for instance, the debate ‘Hungary: Taking Action’ hosted by Verfassungsblog.de, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/themen/antworten-auf-ungarn/#.UYEVxsrgfPo   
(last visited October 2013). 
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partisan political project and the corresponding foreclosure of routine 
political competition.  
From this standpoint, the Fundamental Law seems perfectly in line with 
contemporary European legal and political culture. As Chantal Mouffe 
observes in her analysis on the political, we have entered an era in which 
partisan conflicts are regarded as a thing of the past and are silently replaced 
by post-politics.198 According to this new common sense, the political does not 
disappear but is played out in the moral register: in place of a struggle 
between right and left, post-politics develops as a struggle between right and 
wrong.199 Mouffe does not examine the legal implications of post-politics, but 
it is easy to see how this concept could hardly fit with that of a pluralist 
constitution. Indeed, post-politics operates the same inversion between the 
place of partisanship and the role of the constitution detected in the structure 
of the Fundamental Law: the constitution is no longer the place for an open 
compromise between left and right; it is the locus in which what is right is 
decided. Within the post-political vision, therefore, the room for legitimate 
political contestation is narrowed down, relegating politics (of what remains 
of it) essentially to the implementation of a pre-defined constitutional project. 
Opponents of this project are viewed as enemies and no longer adversaries 
for, in the new context, their claims appear illegitimate and against the course 
of history.200 Thus, by drawing the political frontier in this way, the post-
political vision is not conducive to vibrant democratic debate; it generates 
alienation or intractable and unmediated antagonism between the 
institutional establishment and its marginalised opponents.  
                                                        
198 Mouffe, above n. 16, chapter 3. 
199 Ibidem, 72-76. 
200 Ibidem, 49-50. 
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There is a lot in the post-political vision that is valid for the European Union. 
Although it is impossible to elaborate here an accurate examination of its 
constitutional deficiencies, already a broad brush account will show that not 
only Budapest, but also Brussels contributes to the corrosion of European 
constitutional culture.201 
The distinctive legal qualities of the Union are largely a product of the 
peculiar circumstances in which the European integration project was 
originally conceived. At its inception, the Union lacked the social and political 
preconditions implicit in the idea of pluralist constitution.202 It could vaunt 
neither a shared national identity nor the sense of economic reciprocity 
necessary to activate a redistributive system and a circuit of representative 
democracy.203 European institutions were established essentially as a means 
for sustaining the member states and their national pluralist constitutions by 
overcoming their deficiencies in a world of increasing economic 
interdependence.204 Coherently with this notion, priority was accorded to the 
goal of building a common market.205 Social policies and redistribution were 
left in the hands of the member states which, by means of their pluralist 
constitutions, were in a better position to deal with their related political 
conflicts.206 As a consequence of this division of labour, supranational law 
developed a distinct attitude towards social conflicts. In stark opposition with 
the ethos inspiring pluralist constitutions, it did not aim at their 
                                                        
201 For a more developed version of this argument, see M. Dani, ‘Rehabilitating Social Conflicts in 
European Public Law’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 621.  
202 D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 294-297. 
203 R. Bellamy, ‘The Liberty of the Post-Moderns? Market and Civic Freedom within the EU’, LEQS 
Paper No. 1/2009, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper1.pdf, 10-16. 
204 Ibidem, 16. 
205 D. Chalmers, ‘The Single Market: From Prima Donna to Journeyman’, in J. Shaw, G. Moore 
(eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995), 55. 
206 M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of 
Social Protection (OUP, 2005), 90-95. 
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institutionalisation.207 It nurtured a culture of consensus built upon ideals 
such as ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’, where supranational policy objectives 
were presented as uncontested goals and their pursuit an undertaking in 
which no one would be worse off.208  
This alternative rationale shaped also the nature of supranational legal 
structures. The legal texture of the common market and, notably, its 
regulatory principles reveal significant differences from the constitutive 
principles inserted in pluralist constitutions. Far from encapsulating a 
‘conflictual consensus’ between opposing political parties, they are expression 
of a quasi-Schmittian decision whose overriding goal is access to market.209 As 
such, they are not meant to define a shared space allowing for the 
identification of individuals with different views on market regulation. On 
the contrary, they are decisions spelling out a coherent regulatory project 
whose underlying objective is constraining national political autonomy as 
soon as it interferes with transnational trade. 
Remarkable departures from the canons of the pluralist constitution could be 
noted also in the procedural side of the common market project. For one, 
supranational legislation was conceived of as interstitial legislation. This was 
a direct consequence of the thickness of Treaty norms and of the fact that EU 
legislative instruments most of the times fleshed out market principles as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice.210 Within a similar framework, the 
direction of EU policies was insulated from political disagreement, while 
contestation was allowed only over the means to achieve those pre-defined 
                                                        
207 However, it could be argued that the original European legal framework institutionalized 
interstate conflicts related to the mobility of factors of production, see Dani, above n. 201, 628-
632. 
208 On the ideological neutrality of the European integration process, see Weiler, above n. 175, 88. 
209 Joerges, above n. 21, 340. 
210 P. Craig, ‘The Evolution of the Single Market’, in C. Barnard, J. Scott (eds), The Law of the Single 
European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002), 4. 
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objectives. Another peculiar trait of supranational decision making regarded 
the nature of the institutions involved in it. Originally, the supranational 
political process was monopolised by national and supranational executives 
and representative institutions relegated to a marginal and essentially 
advisory role. As a result, important political questions were displaced to 
modes of decision making implying a considerable degree of ‘technocratic 
depoliticization’.211 Supranational decision making, finally, was structured as 
consensual decision making. The unanimity requirement established by the 
Treaty and de facto prolonged under the Luxembourg Compromise 
discouraged the organisation of a political system along the lines of 
ideological cleavages. The normal modes of policy making were pragmatic 
negotiation and accommodation of national interests,212 an aspect entirely 
consistent with the consensus culture pervading supranational law.   
To be sure, the EU legal framework has evolved considerably from those early 
years. Its remit has been expanded including significant segments of social 
and economic policy. It has been enriched with the language of fundamental 
rights,213 and also its political process has incorporated several democratic 
motives.214 But for all their impact on the EU legal landscape, these 
developments have not entailed a structural modification of the EU 
regulatory framework and its legal culture. On the contrary, they have 
confirmed that “the past of law … is not simply part of its history; it is an 
authoritative significant part of its present”.215 
                                                        
211 P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy – Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (OUP, 2010), 81-
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The influence of original structures on the current EU legal framework 
emerges in form of qualification of all the listed evolutionary trajectories. For 
instance, in expanding EU competences towards the social domain, the 
treaties have not dismissed the original regulatory style of supranational 
intervention. By going social, the Union has not embarked in meaningful 
redistribution of resources.216 As a result, the degree of political mobilisation 
associated with its policies has remained below national standards. Moreover, 
member states have retained within their jurisdictions the most critical 
aspects of social policy. In conferring legislative power to the Union, the 
treaties are careful to avoid interferences with the fundamental principles of 
national social security systems as well as with key issues of national 
industrial relations.217  
The weight of the past is evident also when it comes to the incorporation of 
fundamental rights in the EU legal framework. Originally developed by the 
Court of Justice to buttress the primacy of EU law over national constitutional 
principles,218 fundamental rights have never been meant to question the 
objectives and regulatory strategies inspiring the European integration 
process.219 As a result, their impact on EU legislation and adjudication has 
been limited. Albeit included in the procedures of impact assessment,220 they 
                                                        
216 According to the Financial Framework 2007-2013, the Union budget is 1,23% of the GDP, 
while on average national budgets account for 44% GDP, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/fin_fwk0713/fwk0713_en.cfm  (last visited October 2013). 
217 Article 153 (4) and (5) TFEU. 
218 See, e.g., Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
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220 Communication from the Commission, ‘Strategy for the effective implementation of the 
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have not brought about a shift towards a culture of rights in legislation.221 In 
adjudication, the language of fundamental rights has not called into question 
the original market paradigm. More modestly, fundamental rights have been 
taken into account in the enforcement of free movement principles. Although 
this has prompted important reconsideration in the standards of review of the 
Court of Justice,222 a notorious series of cases shows how the culture of rights 
in the EU is still subordinate to the original commitment to market 
integration.223  
Similar considerations can be formulated also in respect to the developments 
in the political process. Even in the newly acquired policy areas, the goals of 
EU intervention continue to remain insulated from legitimate political 
contestation. By entrenching price stability as the sole objective of monetary 
policy,224 the Treaty makes the Keynesian model of macroeconomic 
management illegitimate.225 By channelling employment policy uniquely 
towards employability and empowerment,226 emancipation is excluded from 
the range of the available social policy alternatives.227 This managerial 
conception of policy-making overshadows important innovations introduced 
in the EU form of government such as qualified-majority voting and the 
increased role of the European Parliament. But also in this regard, some 
consideration is in order. In assessing the democratic virtues of the Union, one 
                                                        
221 I. Butler, ‘Ensuring compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in legislative drafting: 
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should always remember that the process of democratisation of the political 
process has gone hand in hand with the rise of political administration. 228 As 
a result, even after the democratisation of the legislative process, most of the 
law approved at supranational level derives its legitimacy from the 
technocratic paradigm. It is not only the original technocratic character of the 
EU decision making that has been perpetuated; also its consensus culture has 
been maintained. Despite the shift to qualified majority voting, most of the 
items in the Council agenda are decided by consensus,229 and also the 
ordinary legislative procedure is increasingly managed through consensual 
practices such as ‘trialogues’ and ‘first reading agreements’.230  
All of this boils down to the frustration of political conflict in the EU and, as a 
reflection, to a dubious commitment to pluralist constitutionalism by the 
Union. Were it not for some measure of constitutional disguise, it is difficult 
to imagine how this type of legal and political culture could have passed 
serious constitutional scrutiny in the member states. Indeed, as the post-
political vision became dominant in the efficient part of the EU legal 
framework, a corresponding constitutional narrative gained foothold in its 
dignified part. It started by rediscovering the myth of citizenship and 
fundamental rights with the Treaty of Maastricht, and the process came to a 
head in the failed Constitutional Treaty, where the Union too engaged in a 
strategy of ideological re-traditionalisation to conceal its precarious 
legitimacy. In that occasion the invention of tradition did not celebrate 
nationalism and religion, although the proposal to insert an invocatio Dei in 
                                                        
228 R. Dehousse, ‘Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance’ in C. Joerges, 
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the preamble of the treaties was famously aired.231 The object of ideological re-
traditionalisation was European constitutional culture itself, employed by 
European constitution makers as “a credible disguise for a culture that refuses 
to admit the truth about itself”.232  
Recent reforms adopted to cope with the financial crisis have increased the 
distance between the EU legal framework and the idea of pluralist 
constitution.233 The introduction at a supranational level of redistributive 
instruments234 has not brought about a constitutional turn.235 The quid pro quo 
of transnational financial assistance has been an accentuation of the 
regulatory traits of the Union. 236 Post-politics and its corresponding legal 
culture have been exported towards policy areas in which previously political 
contestation and the idea of a pluralist constitution were undisputed.237 
Austerity has been elevated to a quasi-constitutional status,238 and 
competitiveness and structural change have been prescribed as mandatory 
directions for national economic and social policies.239  
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Such acceleration has provoked important changes in both the substantive 
and procedural dimensions of the EU legal framework. In the substantive 
dimension, the Six-Pack240 and the Fiscal Compact241 have transformed the 
constitutional landscape of redistribution. Economic and social rights have 
ceded to macroeconomic indicators and quantitative criteria,242 with the result 
that national economic policies are no longer evaluated in the light of their 
capacity to give substance to the rights and entitlements listed in national bill 
of rights; their performances are measured through a variety of scoreboards, 
yardsticks and thresholds whose rationale and accuracy are beyond political 
contestation.243 
Similarly depressing is the procedural side of the reforms approved. A sense 
of democratic anaemia pervades decision-making at both national and 
supranational level. Through the “European Semester”244 and the “Common 
budgetary timeline”,245 co-administration by the Commission, the ECOFIN 
and national governments replaces representative democracy as the preferred 
course of action to govern national fiscal policy.246 At supranational level, the 
direction of economic policy is assigned to intergovernmental and informal 
                                                        
240 See regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
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fora, traditionally not the best sites to articulate political contestation.247 
Surveillance on national budgets by the tandem ECOFIN/Commission is 
similarly shielded from political opposition. Indeed, for all the hypotheses of 
“Economic Dialogue” inserted in EU legislation,248 it is difficult to see how the 
European Parliament could exert any meaningful influence if debt reduction 
and welfare reform are the only legitimate policy directions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
At the end of his account for the process of European integration,249 Bickerton 
notes that technocracy and populism are emerging as the two dominant 
trends in contemporary European political life.250 He argues that, despite their 
several discrepancies,251 these political doctrines converge in expressing 
scepticism on representative democracy and, more broadly, on social and 
political pluralism.252 The analysis developed in this paper points somehow in 
the same direction: European constitutional culture is being corroded by 
populist and technocratic forces alike. As seen, it is not just Hungary trying to 
divert the attention from its contemporary vicissitudes by restoring the aura 
of a glorious past. Also the Union is implicated in precisely the same strategic 
use of symbolism, trying to evoke the aura of an otherwise waning 
constitutional culture to hide its incapacity to constitute a collective self and 
transcend its regulatory nature.253 Admittedly, this is also where similarities 
end, for there remain important differences between the exaltation of illiberal 
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nationalism and the praise of constitutionalism. Yet, it would be wrong to 
dismiss as a mere coincidence the illustrated assonances as one may even 
suspect the existence of a cause-effect relationship linking technocracy and 
populism.254 
However, if, as we maintain, the idea of pluralist constitution can still offer a 
valid contribution to governing contemporary societies and their conflicts, a 
number of strategies are needed to counter its corrosion. Important steps in 
this direction would be challenging the post-political vision, reasserting the 
role of the constitution and the value of partisanship. Also the terms of 
engagement between the Union and national democracies should be 
reconceptualised: if the Union is unable to offer a supranational equivalent for 
the pluralist constitution, it should at least contribute effectively to defending 
the original concept at national level.  
Unfortunately, there are no signs that the Union will accomplish these 
expectations any time soon. On the one hand, the Union appears unable to 
transcend its post-political ethos and regulatory style; on the other, it seems 
reluctant to react even against the most evident departures from its 
fundamental values. The most immediate result of this impasse is that the 
state of constitutional democracy in Hungary is all the more alarming.255 In 
the period following the entering into force of the Fundamental Law, 
Hungarian political authorities not only have disregarded the invitation for a 
more transparent and inclusive approach to constitutional implementation 
formulated by the Venice Commission,256 but have embarked in a series of 
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constitutional amendments fulfilling the bleakest of the predictions. In 
particular the Fourth amendment to the Fundamental Law exacerbates some 
of the most contentious aspects of the original text.257 The communitarian 
inclination of the constitution is reinforced with provisions reaffirming the 
traditional notion of family258 or conditioning financial support to higher 
education studies to periods of employment in the service of the nation.259 
Increased concern is justified also in respect of provisions concerning the 
efficient part of the constitution. Just to name a few, the amendment 
entrenches the role of the National Office of the Judiciary and its case 
assignment power260 and, even more disquieting, it repeals the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court rendered prior to the entry into force of the 
Fundamental Law.261 
To contrast these developments, European institutions have followed the 
usual unproductive trajectories. In its Opinion on the Fourth Amendment,262 
the Venice Commission has repeated its criticism on the process of 
constitution making and, more broadly, it has censured the “instrumental 
attitude towards the constitution” inspiring the current Hungarian governing 
coalition.263 Also the European Parliament has expressed its criticism in a 
comprehensive and detailed report covering the deficiencies of the 
Fundamental Law and its subsequent amendments.264 But despite the 
                                                        
257An English version of the Fourth Amendment is available at 
http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Fourth%20Amendment%20to%20the%20FL%
20-Eng%20Corrected.pdf (last visited October 2013). 
258 See article 1, amending article L. 
259 See article 7, amending article XI. 
260 See articles 13-14 amending article 25 and 27. 
261 See article 20. 
262 See “Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary” (Opinion no. 
720/2013), 17 June 2013.  
263 Ibidem, § 135-136. 
264 European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 
February 2012) (2012/2130 (INI)). 
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increased quality of the remarks and heightened tone of the reproaches, the 
European Parliament has shown the same hesitations in the activation of the 
article 7 TEU procedure emerged in its previous resolutions. Thus, at the end 
of a long list of reprimands, the approved resolution has only repeated the 
request to the Commission to open infringement proceedings and invoked the 
introduction of a new independent institution entrusted with monitoring the 
respect of EU values.265 It is telling of the crisis of European constitutional 
culture that, faced with an even more dramatic scenario, the only products the 
Union is able to deliver are toothless recommendations, hastily concocted 
proposals of institutional reform and low-profile infringement procedures.266 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
265 Ibidem, § 72-83. 
266 See ‘The European Commission reiterates its serious concerns over the Fourth Amendment of 
the Hungarian Constitution’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-327_en.htm (last 
visited October 2013). 
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